Is a philosophical zombie possible?

A 2013 survey of professional philosophers conducted by Bourget and Chalmers produced the following results: 35.6\% said P Zombies were conceivable but not metaphysically possible; 23.3\% said they were metaphysically possible; 16.0\% said they were inconceivable; and 25.1\% responded “other.”

How does the philosophical zombie differ from the Hollywood zombie?

A philosophical zombie, as opposed to a Hollywood zombie, is an exact physical duplicate of a human being that lacks consciousness. And the reason it behaves just like you is that the physical workings of its brain are indiscernible from the physical workings of your own brain.

What is the relationship between the hard problem of consciousness and the existence of philosophical zombies?

Philosophical zombies are a thought experiment commonly used in discussions of the hard problem. They are hypothetical beings physically identical to humans but lack conscious experience.

Are zombies aware?

They may not be conscious in the same way humans are, but they are aware of their surroundings and respond to their environment.

Does Conceivability entail possibility?

Conceivability is prima facie evidence of metaphysical possibility, but it does not entail metaphysical possibility. To endorse ‘Defeasible Modal Rationalism’ is to say that p’s being (ideally, positively, primarily) conceivable constitutes a merely prima facie reason to believe that p is metaphysically possible.

What is the mind body problem in philosophy?

The mind and body problem concerns the extent to which the mind and the body are separate or the same thing. The mind is about mental processes, thought and consciousness. The body is about the physical aspects of the brain-neurons and how the brain is structured.

What is the difference between the hard problem consciousness and the easy problem of consciousness?

The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods.

Do zombies have memories?

All zombies — fast ones included — seem to have poor memory and lack the ability to plan as a group. “They don’t really have any social skills,” Voytek said. They also lack cognitive control — there’s no delaying the gratification of warm human flesh.

What do philosophical zombies have in common with humans?

By definition, a philosophical zombie is completely indistinguishable by all empirical, objective means from a conscious human being. Its physiological and behavioral responses to sensory stimuli are identical, its responses to questions about their self-consciousness are identical. Everything. The only thing missing i

Why is the concept of zombies materialistic?

I say that it is materialistic because the idea of an entity which behaves like a person but has no conscious experience is grounded in the assumption that a person is first and foremost a human body. By using the term zombie, we are injecting an expectation of unnatural animation to an otherwise inert/lifeless body.

Does the zombie test work for qualia?

Effectively, either the zombie test is terrible or the argument for qualia — or soul, or whatever it is that’s missing — implied by the zombie thought experiment is too weak to be useful.

What is Daniel Dennett’s view of consciousness?

Daniel Dennett, one of the most outspoken critics of p-zombie arguments suggests that ideas like consciousness are not constructs referring to a single thing, but to a collection of things forming a system of processes. This means viewing consciousness as a single aspect that can be added or taken away from a body is incorrect.