What are Conceivability arguments?

The conceivability argument — which assumes physicalism entails that zombies are impossible — purports to refute it by showing they are possible. As we saw, the simplest version of this argument goes: (1) zombies are conceivable; (2) whatever is conceivable is possible; (3) therefore zombies are possible.

Do zombies have a conscience?

Spotting a horror-film zombie should be easy enough, but the zombies of philosophers’ thought experiments are a different matter. They behave almost exactly like everybody else except for one crucial difference: they are not conscious.

How is it like to be a bat?

“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is a paper by American philosopher Thomas Nagel, first published in The Philosophical Review in October 1974, and later in Nagel’s Mortal Questions (1979).

What are the neural correlates and components of consciousness?

The neural correlates of consciousness have been defined as the minimal neural mechanisms that are together necessary and sufficient for experiencing any conscious percept (Crick and Koch, 1990). As we have seen, consciousness is a process that unfolds along two dimensions (wakefulness and phenomenal contents).

What is Chalmer’s zombie argument?

Proponents of philosophical zombie arguments, such as the philosopher David Chalmers, argue that since a philosophical zombie is by definition physically identical to a conscious person, even its logical possibility would refute physicalism, because it would establish the existence of conscious experience as a further …

What is the indivisibility argument?

The Argument from Indivisibility seeks to show that bodies but not minds are spatially divisible and that argument is not rebutted by pointing out that consciousness is temporally divisible. (Indeed, if minds are temporally divisible and bodies are not, we have an argument for dualism of a different sort).

What is the purpose of the zombie argument?

Zombie arguments often support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are metaphysically possible in order to support some form of dualism – in this case the view that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two kinds of property): the mental and the physical.

Are philosophical zombies real?

Proponents of philosophical zombies aren’t arguing that zombies are real or that they could even exist in our universe (though perhaps there’s some awesome zombie multiverse out there), they’re claiming that since we can conceive of the idea of a zombie, it entails that physicalism isn’t sufficient in explaining qualia.

What is the zombie argument against physicalism?

The zombie argument is a version of general modal arguments against physicalism such as that of Saul Kripke and the kind of physicalism known as type-identity theory.

Are p-zombies the same as normal humans?

Since any fact other than that of consciousness may be held to be the same for a p-zombie and for a normal conscious human, it follows that physicalism must hold that p-zombies are either not possible or are the same as normal humans. The zombie argument is a version of general modal arguments against physicalism such as that of Saul Kripke.

What is the zombie argument according to Chalmers?

Chalmers states: “Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature.”. The outline structure of Chalmers’ version of the zombie argument is as follows; According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.